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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article builds on an earlier study analyzing bases and rates of
removal of women and African-American jurors in a set of South Carolina
capital cases decided between 1997 and 2012. We examine and assess
additional data from new perspectives in order to establish a more robust,
statistically strengthened response to the original research question: whether,
and if so, why, prospective women and African-American jurors were
disproportionately removed in different stages of jury selection in a set of
South Carolina capital cases.
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The Supreme Court's 2016 decision in Foster v. Chatman2 brought
Batson v. Kentucky3 and its progeny back onto the national stage. In the
1986 Batson decision, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits prosecutors from using their (discretionary) peremptory challenges
in a racially discriminatory manner.4 The Court subsequently extended the
ban to gender and also concluded that defense counsel, too, were prohibited
from excluding jurors on the basis of race or sex. In last term's decision in
Foster, issued 30 years after capital defendant Timothy Foster's trial, the
Court reaffirmed Batson's core holding and held that the evidence which
included prosecutors' notes revealing a keen focus on jurors' race and the
attorneys' views that black jurors would be acceptable if they "had to" take
6one was sufficient to make out an Equal Protection Clause violation.
While Foster did strike a (small) blow against the widespread
prosecutorial practice of removing jurors of color from capital juries, it was
bittersweet. The defendant's 30-year wait for the decision is telling:
discriminatory jury selection practices are deeply entrenched and the High
Court's decisions have done precious little to bring about systemic change.
Yet, the stakes of jury selection in capital cases are literally matters of life
and death. Capital juries' representativeness affects outcomes, including
individual defendants' likelihood of being found guilty or sentenced to
death.8 In its 1987 decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court overlooked
these systemic defects to hold that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are
an inevitable part of our criminal justice system."9 Although most legal
2. 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. Jd. at 89.
5. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) ("We hold that gender,
like race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality."); Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992) ("[A] defendant's discriminatory exercise of a peremptory
challenge is a violation of equal protection. . .
6. Foster, 136 S. Ct. at 1743.
7. See Patrick C. Brayer, Foster v. Chatman and the Failings of Batson, 102 IOWA L.
REV. ONLINE 53, 53-54 (2016) ("In reflecting on the recent Supreme Court opinion in Foster
v. Chatman, I was struck by how the Court announced the correct ruling, but failed to capture
and comprehend the true reality that racially motivated peremptory strikes still exist and
flourish in our nation's judicial system ... [t]hirty years of Batson-influenced jurisprudence
has been ineffective in changing the reality that black citizens are barred from juries based on
the color of their skin and black litigants, especially criminal defendants, are deprived of true
due process and equal protection.").
8. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, Religion,
andAttitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 282 (2001) ("Because capital
sentencing is so discretionary, considerable room exists for a juror's personal characteristics to
influence her judgment, at least compared to most jury decisions.").
9. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987).
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commentators and even some of the Justices in the McCleskey majority
acknowledge that the case was wrongly decided,'o the Foster judgment
suggests the Court continues to decline to make more aggressive, necessary
changes to eradicate the pernicious effects of race in the capital punishment
system specifically and the criminal justice system generally.
This study of South Carolina jury selection practices in capital cases, as
does the article it builds on, adds to decades of empirical research exploring
the impacts (or lack thereof) of Batson and related jurisprudence on jury
selection practices. Part II briefly surveys literature and case law on the
interactions of race and gender with jury selection and outcomes in capital
cases. Part III describes this study's methodology. Part IV provides the
results of the analysis. Part V concludes with discussion of the results'
implications for capital jury selection and South Carolina law.
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia held that all
then-existing death penalty schemes violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause." While Furman's mandate was far from
clear-five separate opinions made up the majority there did seem to be a
consensus that juries' unfettered discretion resulted in constitutionally
intolerable arbitrariness in the imposition of the death penalty.12 The
concurrences of Justices Stewart and Douglas remarked specifically upon
the higher death sentencing rates of African-American defendants.13 The
Court ushered in the "modem" era of death schemes four years later, finding
that some of the post-Furman capital sentencing regimes fixed, or at least
10. See, e.g., John H. Blume & Sheri L. Johnson, Unholy Parallells Between McClesky
v. Kemp and Plessy v. Ferguson: Why McClesky (Still) Matters, 10 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L.
37, 60 (2012) ("[I]n the long run, we think the moral truth is the surest predictor that
McCleskey, like Plessy, will be consigned to the less-than-glorious past."); Scott E. Sundbuy,
The Loss of Constitutional Faith: McCleskey v. Kemp and the Dark Side of Procedure, 10
OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 5, 5 (2012) ("Especially in the criminal law area, a legal scholar can
invoke MeCleskey confident that the reader will understand that the case is being used as
shorthand for 'cases in which the Supreme Court failed the Constitution's most basic
values."').
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12. James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with Death: The Supreme Court and Capital
Punishment, 1963-2006, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (2007); Chaka M. Patterson, Race and the
Death Penalty: The Tension Between Individualized Justice and Racially Neutral Standards, 2
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 45, 46 (1995).
13. Liebman, supra note 12, at 8.
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appeared to fix, the death penalty's arbitrariness problem.14 However, the
current pattern of capital punishment distribution "is virtually identical to the
pattern Furman ruled unconstitutional."
Many commentators agree that it is simply not possible to tweak capital
16trial procedures enough to make death sentencing non-arbitrary. Both
before and after Furman, a proliferation of studies on interactions among
criminal defendants, capital juries, and sentencing patterns has shown that
race plays a substantial role in capital trials. Pre-Furman, defendants' race
was a factor in whether they were sentenced to death." Post-Furman, the
victim's race became the stronger influence.19 Jurors' characteristics have
also been consistently shown to matter. Jurors' race influences how they
weigh different considerations, their likelihood of empathizing with a
14. John H. Blume & Lindsey S. Vann, Forty Years of Death: The Past, Present and
Future of the Death Penalty in South Carolina (Still Arbitrary After All These Years), 11
DUKE J. OF CON. LAW AND PUB. POL'Y 183, 188 (2016).
15. Liebman, supra note 12, at 12. See also J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic
Dilemma in Death Qualification of Capital Jurors, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1107, 1113
(2014) ("Even a cursory review of state court decisions demonstrates that the incidence of
death sentences imposed on black defendants by all-white juries has been widespread over the
course of post-Furman use of the death penalty.").
16. See Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., WJhen Empathy Bites Back: Cautionary Tales from
Neuroscience for Capital Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REv 573, 598 (2016) ("[T]he decision
to sentence another human being to death is inevitably an arbitrary one, and one that cannot be
divorced from either race or caprice."); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery
of death. For more than 20 years I have endeavored indeed, I have struggled along with a
majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than
the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle
the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the need for
regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the
death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination
of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent
constitutional deficiencies. The basic question-does the system accurately and consistently
determine which defendants 'deserve' to die?-cannot be answered in the affirmative.").
17. Johnson, supra note 16, at 592 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-
90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL
DISPARITIES (1990), at 5-6); David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings
from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638, 1713-15 (1998); Matt Ford, A Tainted
Execution in Georgia, ATLANTIC, Apr. 12, 2016.
18. Liebman, supra note 12, at 13.
19. Id. See also Johnson, supra note 16, at 577 ("[E]mpathy for one person can cause
individuals to act with aggression toward others," meaning that "juror empathy for victims
can . . .be harmful to capital defendants").
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defendant, their propensity to find a defendant guilty, and their likelihood of
20
choosing life or death sentences.
Thus, jury representativeness plays a significant role in the outcomes of
capital cases. In turn, different stages of the jury empanelment process affect
jury representativeness in different ways. While Batson v. Kentucky and its
progeny sought to limit the use of peremptory strikes on constitutionally
impermissible bases, their impact has been of limited consequence.21 Foster
v. Chatman could have served as an opportunity to expand or refine the
doctrine, but more likely, the Court has set a standard for establishing
intentional discrimination that will almost certainly prove to be impossible
to meet except under the most egregious circumstances, like those presented
in Foster.22
The venire and voir dire stages of jury selection also affect jury
representativeness. At the venire stage, although defendants have a right to a
,,23jury "selected at random from a fair cross section of the community,
sources such as voter lists, from which venires may be drawn, tend to
24underrepresent the poor and racial and ethnic minorities. At the voir dire
stage, the process of "qualifying" a capital jury i.e., removing potential
jurors who do not have a "neutral" stance on death sentencing-also has the
effect of disproportionately removing women, African-Americans, and other
groups from the jury pool.25 Although the Court has long held under the
20. Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension:
Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 351-53
(2000); Johnson, supra note 16, at 575-77 ("[E]mpathy lies at the core of the capital trial," and
it is more of a challenge for jurors to cross the "empathic divide" and relate to defendants who
do not "feel familiar"); cf J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma in Death
Qualification of Capital Jurors, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2014) (noting the
ineffectiveness of self-reporting of racial biases to reveal juror attitudes during voir dire).
21. Patrick C. Brayer, Foster v. Chatman and the Failings of Batson, 102 IOWA L. REV.
ONLINE 53, 54-55 (2016).
22. A long-time public defender observed that Foster could have done more for
protecting criminal defendants' rights to due process and equal protection by validating a
Washington Supreme Court decision in which the court called for replacing Batson 's
"purposeful discrimination" test with a test that "necessarily accounts for and alerts trial courts
to the problem of unconscious bias," such as if there were "a reasonable probability that race
was a factor in the exercise of the peremptory strike," or the but-for cause for use of the strike.
Id. (discussing State v. Saintcaille, 309 P.3d 326, 339 (Wash. 2013)).
23. 28 U.S.C. 1861 (1968).
24. Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructing a Jury that Is Both Impartial
and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703,
705 (1998); Michael S. Zuklie, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 101, 104 (1996) (discussing federal juries).
25. J. Thomas Sullivan, The Demographic Dilemma in Death Qualification of Capital
Jurors, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1107, 1134 (2014).
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Equal Protection Clause that cognizable groups may not be systematically
excluded from jury service,26 it has also held that disparate impacts based on
27attitudes do not constitute systematic exclusion.
This study focuses on South Carolina, where prior empirical work has
observed significant, multi-faceted race effects in the administration of the
death penalty. In 1983, Paternoster investigated South Carolina prosecutors'
charging decisions in 1,800 homicides from 1977 to 1981 and found
"glaring disparities in the likelihood of a death request" depending on
geography and the race of the victim, with black offender/white victim cases
in rural areas showing an eleven times greater likelihood of a death request
than a black offender/black victim case in an urban area, although the
21victim's race was the most important predictor. Songer and Unah,
investigating similar questions using South Carolina homicide data from
1993 to 1997, found similar urban/rural disparities, an eight-times-higher
likelihood of having death sought in the most death-prone district compared
to the least death-prone district, and legally impermissible factors such as
victim and defendant characteristics influencing capital case selection; they
concluded that despite Gregg, "arbitrariness and discrimination are still
present in South Carolina's capital punishment system."29
Blume and co-authors similarly found from 1977 to 2002 in South
Carolina "wide disparity from county to county and judicial circuit to
judicial circuit in the frequency in which prosecutors seek the death penalty
and in which the death penalty is imposed," as well as effects of defendant
26. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559 (1979) ("[D]iscrimination in the selection of
the grand jury remains a valid ground for setting aside a criminal conviction."); Norris v. State
of Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935) ("Whenever by any action of a state . . . all persons of
the African race are excluded, solely because of their race or color, from serving as grand
jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of the African race, the equal protection of the
laws is denied to him, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.").
27. Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 415 (1987) (holding that excluding veniremen
based on their conscientious objections to the death penalty does not violate fair cross section
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence because those veniremen do not constitute a distinctive
group); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) ("[W]e impose no requirement that petit
juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive groups in
the population.").
28. Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek
the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 762, 783 (1983).
The study controlled for the type of homicide committed and other possible aggravating
factors. Id. at 784.
29. Michael Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on
Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161,
205 (2006).
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and victim race.30 Expanding the inquiry to 40 years of post-Gregg cases,
Blume and Vann concluded that South Carolina's death penalty scheme is
plagued by errors and unreliability, continues to reveal disproportionate
sentences for white-victim cases (81%), and remains highly variable
depending on the district of the case.31
Notably, one South Carolina prosecutor, Donald Myers of Lexington
County, has received both scholarly and public attention for his zeal for the
death penalty and his overt racial prejudice, contributing to the variability of
32death sentences in the state. From 1997 to 2016, Myers obtained a total of
thirty-nine death sentences and sought the death penalty in white-victim
cases at dramatically higher rates than black-victim cases despite African-
Americans' higher likelihood of being murder victims.33 One of the final
death sentences in Myers' career was overturned because he compared the
black, male defendant to King Kong.34 Attorneys practicing in Lexington
County and researchers established anecdotal and statistical data indicating
that the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to exclude black jurors in
criminal trials.35  The consistent theme throughout these decades of
observation is that South Carolina's death penalty scheme remains both
discriminatory and arbitrary.
This Article and its predecessor were motivated by Catherine Grosso's
and Barbara O'Brien's study on race as a factor in the use of peremptory
36strikes in 173 post-Batson North Carolina capital cases, as no comparable
studies have been pursued in South Carolina. In that study, Grosso and
O'Brien investigated jury selection in the trials of all defendants on the
state's death row as of July 1, 2010, in order to assess whether venire
30. John H. Blume, Twenty-Five Years ofDeath: A Report of the Cornell Death Penalty
Project on the "Modern" Era of Capital Punishment in South Carolina, CORNELL LAW
FACULTY PUBL'N, Paper 243 (2002), at 305. See also John H. Blume et al., A Tale of Two
(and Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years
After the Supreme Court's Creation of a Categorical Bar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 393
(2014).
31. Blume, supra note 14, at 183-254.
32. Id.; Blume et al., Post-McClesky Claims of Race Discrimination in Capital Cases,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771 (1998); Andrew Cohen, A Judge Overturned a Death Sentence
Because the Prosecutor Compared a Black Defendant to King Kong, MARSHALL PROJECT
(March 28, 2016), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/03/28/a-judge-overturned-a-
death-sentence-because-the-prosecutor-compared-a-black-defendant-to-king-kong#.7f5tl2hJT.
33. Blume, supra note 14, at 207.
34. Cohen, supra note 32.
35. Blume, supra note 32, at 1792.
36. Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O'Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97
IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1533 (2012).
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members' race had been a factor in prosecutors' use of peremptory
challenges.37 After examining 7,421 venire members, they concluded that
"[p]rosecutors exercised peremptory challenges at a significantly higher rate
against black venire members than against all other venire members,"
striking 52.6% of eligible black venire members and 25.7% of others.38 The
disparity was greater in cases with black defendants.39 When the authors
controlled for possible race-neutral reasons for removals, the disparities
persisted.4 0
This Article's predecessor (Part I of this study), although narrower in
scope than O'Brien and Grosso's study, reached comparable conclusions.
Key findings for observations of 3,031 venire members for gender and 1,088
venire members for race (with limited available data on jurors' race
accounting for the disparity) in South Carolina capital cases tried from 1997
to 2012 included: (1) African-Americans were removed disproportionately
at the voir dire stage because of opposition to the death penalty (32% of
black venire members, compared to 8% of white venire members), as were
women at a lower rate; (2) the prosecution struck black potential jurors at a
disproportionately high rate (35% of black strike-eligible venire members, or
15% of all black venire members, compared with striking 12% of white
strike-eligible venire members, or 8% of all white venire members); (3) the
prosecution was more likely to exercise peremptory strikes on women and
the defense was more likely to strike men; and (4) the combined effects of
removal for views against the death penalty and the use of prosecutorial
strikes functioned as a substantial impediment to African-Americans serving
on the jury (accounting for removing 47% of black venire members in the
study, compared with 16% of white venire members), with black jurors
ultimately underrepresented on juries.4' The discussion below explains how
this Article (Part II of the study) expands upon these findings.
III. METHODOLOGY
For Part II of this study, we again examine the strike rates of state and
defense counsel in South Carolina capital cases. In addition, we examine
whether the rates differ based on race and gender of the venire member or
based on the defendant's race. Next, we explore how the use of peremptory
37. Id. at 1533.
38. Id. at 1548.
39. Id. at 1549. In these cases, "the average strike rate was 60% against black venire
members and 23.1% against other venire members." Id.
40. Id. at 1551.
41. Eisenberg, supra note 1.
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challenges by the state and defense counsel influence the likelihood that the
jury will be representative of the county in terms of race and gender. We test
whether a disparity may be better explained by venire members being
excused for cause.
Transcripts of voir dire questioning were used to collect data from
thirty-five different capital cases in South Carolina from the period of 1997
42to 2014, including observations for 3,159 venire members. Trial transcripts
were acquired from the Office of Appellate Defense, a division of the South
Carolina Office of Indigent Defense. Additional materials, such as juror
questionnaires, were retrieved from attorneys who had worked on the cases.
From these materials, research assistants collected available information
about potential jurors, including their race, gender, ultimate status on the
jury (seated, became an alternate juror, excused for cause, dismissed via a
peremptory strike, or qualified but not reached for strikes), and the reason
the juror was excused, if applicable.
If unavailable in the record, research assistants were often able to figure
out the gender of potential jurors from their names or the judges' or
attorneys' use of the terms "sir," "ma'am," "Mr.," or "Ms." The race of
potential jurors was collected only when explicitly stated in the transcript,
which meant that less information was collected for race than for gender,
though some information on race was available through review of juror
questionnaires. There were thirty-five cases with available information on
potential jurors' gender (with observations of 3,159 venire members, 128
43more than in Part I), and twenty-nine cases with available information on
potential jurors' race (with observations of 1,872 venire members, 784 more
than in Part I). As data collection has been ongoing, this analysis includes
more cases with complete information than Part I did; some cases with
incomplete information that were included in the Part I analysis were
42. Bayan Aleksey (1998); Jonathan Kyle Binney (2003); Steven Vernon Bixby (2007);
Ricky Lee Blackwell (2014); James Nathaniel Bryant (2004); Luzenski Allen Cottrell (2005;
2014); Kamell D. Evans (2004); Fredrick Evins (2004); Ron Oneal Finklea (2007); Jeffrey
Haselden (2001); David Mark Hill (2000); William Kelley (1998); Michael Laney (2001);
Marion Lindsey (2004); Jimmy Locklair (1996); Kevin Mercer (2006); Eric Dale Morgan
(2004); Jeffrey Motts (2007); Freddie Owens (2006); Jesse Waylon Sapp (2003); Brad Keith
Sigmon (2002); Stephen Stanko (2006; 2009); Norman Starnes (1997; 2007); Bobby Wayne
Stone (1997; 2005); Christopher Dale Tench (2000); Angel Joe Pierre Vasquez (2003); John
Edward Weik (1999); Charles Williams (2005); Louis Michael Winkler (2008); Arthur
Hastings (2001); Anthony Woods (2006).
43. Race data was not available for Luzenski Allen Cottrell (trial 1); Marion Lindsey;
Eric Dale Morgan; Jeffrey Motts; Freddie Owens; and John Edward Weik.
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excluded here.44 Thus, in addition to adding to the data used in Part I, the
data included here have fewer gaps.
In addition, researchers coded the reason why potential jurors were
dismissed for cause into eleven different categories: automatic death
disposition, refusal to enforce death, bias,45 illiteracy or incomprehension of
court instructions, knew someone involved in case, medical issues, perjury
or contempt of court,46 prior conviction, work or personal timing conflict,
personal reasons,47 and reason unknown.
There are several limitations to this study. First, we have tried
(diligently) to gather data from as many capital cases as possible, but the
collection of data is still ongoing. Therefore, the dataset is currently not a
random or exhaustive sample of South Carolina capital punishment cases,
but rather the data readily available to the researchers. Cases were included
in this study if we had substantially complete data for the venire, including
knowing the ultimate status of the prospective jurors. Another limitation to
this study is that the cases examined are only cases that resulted in death.
Future research should compare jury selection in cases that did not result in
death to control for possible juror characteristics or pre-trial procedures that
may increase the likelihood of a death sentence. We were also unable to
control for race- and gender-neutral factors accounting for juror strikes.
IV. RESULTS
Question 1 - What are the strike rates of the state and defense counsel?
Do the rates differ based on race and gender of the venire member? Of the
defendant and victim?
We estimated "strike rates" to measure state and defense decisions to
strike or accept potential jurors.48 We estimated the number of strike-eligible
jurors by adding the number of jurors who ultimately served, served as
alternates, were struck, and were qualified and not reached at the strike
44. Some cases with incomplete data were included in some parts of this analysis and
not others. When cases are excluded, we indicate it in the Results section.
45. For example, if the potential juror was familiar with the case, had listened to media
coverage about the case, or had previously been the victim of a similar crime.
46. This category was also used if the potential juror disagreed with the rule of law. For
example, one juror believed that defendants should have to prove their own innocence.
47. This category was used as a catch-all for otherwise uncategorized reasons, such as
being over the age of 65 or being an employee of the courthouse. For some cases coded early
in the process, research assistants coded all explanations other than "refusal to enforce death"
and "automatic death disposition" as personal.
48. See David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder
Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 48 (2001).
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stage. In our calculation of eligible jurors for defense strikes we did not
include the jurors struck by the state, because they are removed from the
pool before the defense exercises their strikes. We used strike rates to
examine whether state and defense counsel use peremptory strikes at
different rates depending on the race and gender of venire members. The
defense is allotted 10 peremptory strikes for primary jurors and 2 strikes for
each alternate juror called. The state is allotted 5 peremptory strikes for
primary jurors and 1 for each alternate juror.49 Table 1 presents the average
state and defense strike rates.50 As expected, the defense strike rate is higher,
with the defense striking approximately six more venire members per case
than the state. The defense strikes approximately 11.24 venire members per
case. The state strikes approximately 5.55 venire members per case.
TABLE 1. AVERAGE DEFENSE AND STATE STRIKES PER CASE.5 '
State Defense
Strikes 5.55 11.24
Strike-eligible venire members 39.24 33.7
Strike rate 14% 34%
Next, we examined whether defense and state strike rates differed based
on the race and gender of the venire member.52 Twenty-eight cases in our
dataset included substantially complete information on the venire members'
race, gender, and status on the jury.53 As shown in Table 2, the state struck
black males at the highest rate (33%) and white males at the lowest rate
(10%). The defense struck white males at the highest rate (42%) and black
males at the lowest rate (8%). A two-way analysis of variance tested the
49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1110 ("Any person who is arraigned for the crime of
murder ... is entitled to peremptory challenges not exceeding ten, and the State in these cases
is entitled to peremptory challenges not exceeding five."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1120 ("In
criminal cases the prosecution is entitled to one and the defendant to two peremptory
challenges for each alternate juror called. . . .").
50. No peremptory strike data was available for Jesse Waylon Sapp, so the data from
this case was excluded from the peremptory strike analyses.
51. This analysis includes 34 cases in our dataset that have peremptory strike
information. See Appendix A.
52. Because of the scarcity of potential jurors of races other than black or white (six
Asian, five Hispanic, two Native American, and one multiracial), those jurors will not be
included in this analysis or any of the following analyses assessing race.
53. We are missing venire members' race in the following cases: Luzenski Cottrell (trial
1), Marion Lindsey, Eric Morgan, Jeffrey Motts, Freddie Owens, and John Weik.
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influence of decision-maker (state and defense) and race and gender of
venire member (black female, black male, white female, and white male) on
the likelihood of being struck from the jury. The venire member's race and
gender revealed significant differences, F(3) = 3.00, p < 0.05. In addition,
the interaction of decision-maker and venire member race and gender was
highly significant, suggesting that state and defense counsel strike venire
members by race and gender at very different rates, F(3) = 27.09, p <
0.0001.
TABLE 2. AVERAGE STRIKES PER CASE BASED ON RACE AND GENDER OF
VENIRE MEMBER.
Decision Black Black White White
Maker Female Male Female Male
State Strike rate 25% 33% 15% 10%
Strike eligible 3.46 2.89 14.71 14.82
Defense Strike rate 8% 6% 34% 42%
Strike eligible 2.46 1.96 12.43 13.29
Finally, we tested whether state and defense strike rates differ based on
the race of the defendant. Of the 28 cases with substantial race, gender, and
peremptory strike information, 11 cases have black male defendants and 17
cases have white male defendants.54 As shown in Table 3, defense counsel
was less likely to strike black venire members in cases with a black
defendant. The defense struck 1% of black women and 0% of black men in
cases with a black defendant, and 12% of black women and 10% of black
men in cases with a white defendant. Independent-samples t-tests revealed
that the defense strike rate of black females was significantly different in
white and black defendant cases t(26)=1.76, p<.05. Other comparisons were
not significant, which is likely due to the reduced sample size.
54. South Carolina has only sentenced one woman to death and her case was not
included in our analysis. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, WOMEN AND THE
DEATH PENALTY, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/women-and-death-penalty#State%20
Breakdown (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
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TABLE 3. AVERAGE STRIKES PER CASE BASED ON RACE AND GENDER OF
VENIRE MEMBER SEPARATED BY RACE OF THE DEFENDANT.
Black Defendant
Black Black White White
Female Male Female Male
State Strike rate 31% 29% 13% 7%
Strike eligible 3.64 2.45 15.18 13.27
Defense Strike rate 1% 0% 32% 45%
Strike eligible 2.27 1.73 13.09 12.27
White Defendant
Black Black White White
Female Male Female Male
State Strike rate 21% 36% 17% 13%
Strike eligible 3.35 3.18 14.41 15.82
Defense Strike rate 12% 10% 36% 41%
Strike eligible 2.59 2.12 12.00 13.94
Question 2 - How does the use of for-cause challenges influence the
likelihood that the jury will be representative of the county in terms of race
and gender?
An analysis was conducted to compare the racial and gender
compositions of juries in our dataset to the demographics of the counties in
which the cases took place. For this analysis, the gender and racial
composition of both the seated jury and the alternates were used. Thirty-five
different cases were used to examine gender and twenty-nine cases were
used to examine race. Results of this analysis are shown in Table 4. Because
sample size for each county was low,5 5 statistical testing was not done to
compare average composition of each jury to the actual county
demographics. However, the trends tend to show that black jurors are
underrepresented on capital juries, compared to the actual percentage of
black people living in the county.
To better test representativeness, an analysis was completed to compare
the average racial and gender compositions of juries across all of the cases in
the database compared to the actual demographics of South Carolina as a
55. Most counties only hosted one or two cases, with the exception of Greenville (six),
Horry (five), Lexington (six), Spartanburg (six), and Sumter (three).
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whole (rather than county by county). One limitation of this analysis is that
South Carolina demographic information was used from the most recent
census in 2015, while some of these cases occurred much earlier when
56demographics could have been slightly different. In 2015, South Carolina
was 51.40% female, compared to the average jury in our dataset, which was
49.02% female. An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare
the percent of women on each jury to the percent of women in South
Carolina, and a significant difference was found, t(68)=1 19.11, p<.O1. There
are more women in South Carolina than are represented, on average, on a
capital jury. South Carolina was 27.90% black, while the average jury in our
dataset is 18.80% black. An independent-samples t-test was conducted to
compare the percent of black people on each jury to the percent of black
people in South Carolina, and a significant difference was found;
t(55)=240.43, p<.O1. There are more black people in South Carolina than are
represented, on average, on a capital jury.
TABLE 4. RACIAL AND GENDER COMPOSITION OF JURIES BY COUNTY
31 62.50% 51.
23.33% 60.00% 24.60% 51.50%
6.67% 60.00% 16.50% 51.80%
30.77% 30.77% 25.00% 50.10%
6.67% 53.33% 20.80% 51.40%
37.50% 62.50% 48.30% 50.80%
35.71% 25.90% 51.30%
46.67% 26.67% 32.10% 52.50%
11.67% 47.69% 18.50% 51.40%
20.36% 57.94% 13.60% 51.60%
5.87% 41.51% 15.30% 51.20%
50.00% 50.00% 62.10% 53.30%
56. The earliest cases occurred in 1997.
57. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU QUICKFACTS, https://www.census.gov/quick
facts/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
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39.25% 55.87% 47.20% 51.80%
18.80% 49.02% SOUTH 27.90% 51.40%
CARO-
LINA:
Because these results suggest that the average capital jury is not
representative of South Carolina, either with regard to race or gender, we
next examined whether these disparities could be explained due to for cause
challenges. If more women than men are dismissed from the jury pool due to
negative feelings toward the death penalty, this could explain why there are
proportionally fewer women on a capital jury than in South Carolina. The
same could also be true for racial disparities.
Independent-samples t-tests were used to compare the reasons potential
jurors were excused for cause across race (black, white) and gender (male,
female). We were particularly interested in whether a certain demographic
was more likely to be excluded for cause due to an automatic death
disposition or refusal to enforce the death penalty. A total of 189 potential
jurors were excused due to automatic death disposition (14 black, 112 white,
63 unknown or other; 62 female, 127 male). An average of 6.56% of white
potential jurors (SD=0.07) were excused across cases due to automatic death
disposition, compared to 2.30% of black potential jurors (SD=0.04). The
difference between black and white potential jurors was statistically
significant, with white jurors more likely to be excused due to an automatic
death disposition; t(56)=2.70, p<.01. For women, an average of 3.96% of
potential jurors were excused due to automatic death disposition across all
cases (SD=0.04), compared to 7.97% of male potential jurors (SD=0.08).
The difference between men and women was statistically significant, with
men more likely to be excused due to an automatic death disposition;
t(68)=2.73, p<.O1. Thus, both men and white potential jurors are more likely
to express an automatic death disposition.
A total of 378 potential jurors were excused due to a refusal to enforce
the death penalty (120 black, 106 white, 152 unknown or other; 217 female,
161 male). An average of 23.95% of black potential jurors were excused due
to a refusal to enforce the death penalty (SD=0.22), compared to 6.20% of
white potential jurors (SD=.06). The difference between black and white
potential jurors was statistically significant, with black jurors more likely to
be excused due to a refusal to enforce the death penalty; t(56)=4.11, p<.01.
For women, an average of 14.28% of potential jurors were excused due to a
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refusal to enforce the death penalty across all cases (SD=0.09), compared to
9.94% of male potential jurors (SD=0.06). The difference between men and
women was statistically significant, with women more likely to be excused
due to a refusal to enforce the death penalty; t(68)=2.30, p=.02. Thus, both
women and black potential jurors are more likely to express an
unwillingness to enforce the death penalty.
We found one additional significant difference between bases of
excusals for cause between black and white potential jurors. White potential
jurors were excused due to knowing someone involved in the case
(M=0.81%, SD=0.02) at a higher rate than black potential jurors (M=O%,
SD=0.0); t(56)=2.72, p<.01. The differences between excusals for bias,
illiteracy or incompetency, medical issues, perjury or being in contempt of
court, personal reasons, prior convictions, and work or personal timing
conflicts was not statistically significant across race.
There were other significant differences for why men and women were
excused for cause. For females excused due to bias (M=5.51%, SD=0.08)
compared to males (M=9.80%, SD=0.09), a greater percentage of men were
excused due to bias, t(68)=2.04, p=.04. For females excused due to a
medical issue (M=1.45%, SD=0.02) compared to males (M=0.50%,
SD=0.012), females were more likely to be excused due to a medical issue;
t(68)=2.04, p=.045. For females excused due to a prior conviction
(M=0.36%, SD=0.001) compared to males (M=1.48%, SD=0.003), males
were more likely to be excused due to a prior conviction; t(68)=2.72, p<.01.
The differences between excusals for illiteracy or incompetence, knowing
someone involved in the case, perjury or being in contempt of court,
personal reasons, and work or personal timing conflicts were not statistically
significant across gender.
V. CONCLUSION
Although limited in their generalizability, the findings in this study add
to data on persistent problems with jury representativeness in capital cases in
South Carolina. First, the findings from Part I of this study persisted with the
stronger dataset in Part II and are consistent with many previous studies'
findings indicating that capital jury selection procedures serve to
systematically siphon off women and African-Americans through the death-
qualification process and peremptory strikes. Key findings in Part I included
that the prosecution struck 35% of strike-eligible black potential jurors,
accounting for removing 15% of black venire members; that approximately
32% of black venire members were removed for opposition to the death
penalty; and that the combined effects of these two stages prevented a total
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of 47% of black venire members from serving, compared to those stages
preventing a combined 16% of the white venire pool from serving.
Those findings have for the most part persisted with the stronger dataset
here, with slight variations. The prosecution struck 29% of strike-eligible
black potential jurors (the average of a 33% strike rate for black men and
25% for black women), accounting for removing 13% of black venire
members; approximately 24% of black venire members were removed for
opposition to the death penalty; and the combined effects of these two stages
prevented a total of 42% of black venire members from serving. This is
compared to the prosecution striking 12.5% of strike-eligible white potential
jurors, which equates to about 7% of the overall white venire pool; and 6.2%
of white potential jurors being removed for anti-death views, with the two
stages preventing, combined, an approximate 13% of white venire members
*58from serving.
Although race- or gender-neutral factors might explain some of these
disparities, the consistency of these findings with those of previous studies
suggests that prosecutors' use of peremptory strikes was motivated by race,
and to a lesser extent, gender, underscoring Batson's inefficacy once again;
and that the death-qualification process has disparate impacts according to
race and gender. Procedures for jury selection in these capital cases may not
nominally involve systematic exclusion of a racial group from jury service.
But the overall effect in practice is systematic exclusion and
58. The defense's strike rate variations by race and gender, although notable, are of less
interest in this study for several reasons. Primarily, the rationale behind the existence of
peremptory challenges in the first place is to afford protections to a criminal defendant. The
prosecutor's capacity to discriminate is arguably distinguishable from the defendant's capacity
to discriminate because the prosecutor is a state actor potentially depriving a defendant of his
or her liberty. See generally Sharon Leigh Nelles, Extending Batson v. Kentucky to the
Criminal Defendant's Use of the Peremptory Challenge: The Demise of the Challenge without
Cause, 33 B.C.L. REV. 1081 (1992). Similarly, a concern motivating empirical inquiry into
these matters is the jury's protective function for the defendant. That is, a jury is meant to
serve as a check on zealous government actors overriding a defendant's right to a fair trial.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). Yet, unrepresentative juries tend to do just the
opposite, instead serving as another vehicle for majority rule. Cf id. at 530 (the jury as
"prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of
the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool"). Thus, defense
counsel's strikes that are potentially based on unconstitutional bases are of less concern
because their ultimate effect is not to effectuate unrepresentative juries, due to their tendency
to target white men. Finally, defense attorneys may be said to have an ethical obligation to take
demographic considerations into account in their efforts to advocate for their clients. As
discussed in Part I of this study, "a defense attorney may take race into account for her choices
of strikes if she feels that an attempt to comply with Batson would force her to ignore, to her
client's detriment, her knowledge of the statistical evidence of how jurors' attitudes are
influenced by their race." Eisenberg, supra note 1.
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unrepresentative juries. These findings again highlight the discrimination
and arbitrariness that infect South Carolina's capital punishment system, and
the longstanding fictions of Gregg and Batson.
APPENDIX A
TABLE X. STATUS OF VENIRE MEMBERS IN SAMPLE.
Case Seated Excused Peremptory Peremptory Qualified
and for cause strike - strike - State not reached
alter- Defense
nates
Aleksey, Bayan 14 78 8 4 10
Binney, 15 29 16 7
Johnathan Kyle
Bixby, Steven 17 83 11 3 5
Vernon
Blackwell, 12 2 6 12
Ricky Lee
Bryant, James 14 45 10 6 12
Nathaniel
Cottrell, 15 30 13 6 7
Luzenski Allen
(trial 1)
Cottrell, 16 13 7
Luzenski Allen
(trial 2)
Evans, Kamell 15 58 10 5 8
D.
Evins, Fredrick 14 24 12 7
Finklea, Ron 15 35 10 5 13
Oneal
Haselden, 14 18 13 7 3
Jeffrey
Hill, David 15 43 12 4 2
Mark
Kelley, William 14 10 12 7 5
Laney, Michael 15 58 14 6 4
Lindsey, Marion 15 42 10 5 9
Locklair, Jimmy 15 41 10 6 8
Mercer, Kevin 15 39 14 7 7
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Case Seated Excused Peremptory Peremptory Qualified
and for cause strike - strike - State not reached
alter- Defense
nates
Morgan, Eric 15 48 14 6 6
Dale
Motts, Jeffrey 13 45 8 3
Owens, Freddie 15 33 8 3 18
Sapp, Jesse 14 281
Waylon
Sigmon, Brad 15 18 12 6 5
Keith
Stanko 15 73 8 4 18
(Georgetown)
Stanko, Stephen 16 63 12 4 13
(Horry)
Starnes, 14 14 6 5 11
Norman (trial 1)
Starnes, Normal 15 73 12 6 14
(trial 2)
Stone, Bobby 15 35 12 7 6
(trial 1)
Stone, Bobby 14 22 10 7 6
(trial 2)
Tench, 15 40 7 6 37
Christopher
Dale
Vasquez, Angel 14 58 10 4
Joe Pierre
Weik, John 14 27 12 5 5
Edward
Williams, 15 41 13 5 4
Charles
Winkler, Louis 16 65 15 8 6
Michael
Wise, Arthur 15 25 13 5 5
Hastings
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